Category: Uncategorized

[CASE DIGEST] PANFILO LACSON vs. SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ (G.R. No. 147780      May 10, 2001)

Facts:

President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them.

Issue:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same.

Held:

President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.

[CASE DIGEST] EMILIO A. GONZALES III vs Office of the President (G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014)

Facts:

In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.  The Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i)… found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed on him the penalty of dismissal.

Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain the disciplinary proceedings against her, solely questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to subject her to disciplinary proceedings.  The Court affirmed the continuation of the proceedings against her… after upholding the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.

In view of the Court’s ruling, the OP filed the present motion for reconsideration through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several others, before the Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering.  On May 7, 2007, Garcia filed an Urgent Petition for Bail which the prosecution opposed.  The Sandiganbayan denied Garcia’s urgent petition for bail on January 7, 2010, in view of the strength of the prosecution’s evidence against Garcia.

Issues: Can the President remove an a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor

Ruling:

Yes. While the Ombuds­man’s authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.

[CASE DIGEST] ANTONIETTE V.C. MONTESCLAROS vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2002)

Facts: 

The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the Kabataang Barangay to Sangguniang Kabataan and limited its membership to youths “at least 15 but no more than 21 years of age.” On 18 February 2002, Antoniette  VC Montesclaros demanded from COMELEC that SK elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002. COMELEC Chairman Alfredo Benipayo wrote to the House of Representatives and the Senate on 20 February 2002 inquiring on the status of pending bills on SK and Barangay elections and expressed support to postpone the SK election on November 2002. On 11 March 2002 the Bicameral Committee consolidated Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill 4456, resetting the SK election to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership age to at least 15 but no more than 18 years of age. This was approved by the Senate and House of Representative on 11 March and 13 March 2002 respectively and signed by the President on 19 March 2002. The petitioners filed prohibition and mandamus for temporary restraining order seeking the prevention of postponement of the SK election and reduction of age requirement on 11 March 2002.

Issue: 

Whether or not the proposed bill is unconstitutional.

Decision: 

Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. This petition presents no actual justiciable controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional. Petitioner’s perayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill does not present actual controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. Having no legal effect it violates no constitutional right or duty. At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164 was not yet enacted into law. After its passage petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional.

[CASE DIGEST] JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GR No 118577 07 March 1995

Facts:

Juanito Mariano, resident of Makati filed a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief, assailing unconstitutional sections in RA 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”). Petitioners contend that (1) Section 2 Article I of RA 7854 failed to delineate the land areas of Makati by metes and bounds with technical descriptions, (2) Section 51 Article X of RA 7854 collides with Section 8 Article X and Section 7 Article VI of the Constitution, that the new corporate existence of the new city will restart the term of the present municipal elective making it favourable to incumbent Mayor Jejomar Binay, and (3) Section 52 Article X of RA 7854 for adding a legislative district is unconstitutional and cannot be made by special law.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7854 is unconstitutional.

Decision:

Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city’s land area “shall comprise the present territory of the municipality.”

The Court cannot entertain the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.

In Tobias vs Abalos, Court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city.

[CASE DIGEST] JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,vs.THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

FACTS:

Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.

On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat’l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat’l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat’l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara’s petition.

Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua’s protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat’l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy;

Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

RULING:

In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as “the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.” (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.

[CASE DIGEST] Marbury vs. Madison

FACTS:

Petitioner William Marbury was appointed Justice of the Peace for the county if Washington in the District of Columbia by then President John Adams of the US shortly before the latter vacated his Office. However, Adams’ Secretary of State, John Marshall, failed to deliver to Marbury the latter’s duly signed and sealed commission documents, without which the petitioner cannot undertake his office as Justice of the Peace.

When Thomas Jefferson assumed presidency, his new Secretary of State, herein respondent James Madison, continued to withhold the said commission document from Marbury. Hence, this petition for mandamus was filed to the US Supreme Court to compel Madison to deliver the commission document top Marbury.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the same Court has jurisdiction to issue the mandamus, given the circumstances of the case

RULING

The US Supreme Court, through the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, denied Marbury’s petition for mandamus on the argument that the said Court has no jurisdiction on the case, and that the law on which Marbury based the said petition is unconstitutional.

As a general rule, the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, and shall have appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. In the case at bar, the Court made it clear that Marbury had already attained the five year legal right ti the commission because of the fact that the commission document has been completed the moment it was officially sealed, obliterating any doubt as to the authenticity of the signature affixed by the US President himself. However, Marbury failed to show that the mandamus he prays for is an exercise of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, not its original jurisdiction, which led to the denial of his petition.

“It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it reviews and corrects the proceedings in a case already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed ot courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer to deliver a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an original jurisdiction, Neither is it necessary in such a case as this, to enable the Court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction”

Another general rule is that any law repugnant to the Constitution is void. The Courts, as well as other departments, are bound by the instrument, as repeatedly emphasized by Chief Justice Marshall. He further reiterated that the written Constitution should be upheld and protected at all times, and that the Court has a duty to ensure that such reverence is given to the written Constitution. It must remain above all laws.

The power of the legislative department to create laws cannot ever exceed the written Constitution which itself is the source of such power. The power remains to the legislature to assign original jurisdiction to that Court in other cases; provided those cases belong to the jurisdictional power of the US. As to the power of the President over the officer whom he appoints, it is limited by the written Constitution and is deemed completed the moment he affixed his signature unto the commission document and “to withhold the commission x x x is an act deemed by the Court not warranted by law but violative of a vested right.” The action for mandamus in this case filed by the petitioner is in excess of the Court’s jurisdiction, and any law enacted by the legislature which diminish or increase the Court’s jurisdiction without the Court’s prior consent is unconstitutional and must be discharged.

HOW TO DIGEST A CASE

5 easy steps

  1. Check the topic of the case covered in your syllabus. For example, ABC vs EFG is under the topic of Essential Elements of Marriage, take note of that topic while you’re reading the case.
  2. Read the ruling portion first. In this part you may scan the case and look for the portion that discusses the topic assigned.
  3. Then read the whole case. Now that you’ve already read the ruling, you can focus on the facts of the case that relate to the ruling.
  4. Generate the issue. The issue must be answered by the ruling of the case.
  5. Finally, arrange your case digest. Facts, Issue and Ruling.

This is how I digest a case. I hope you share it with your friends.

[CASE DIGEST] Liam Law vs. Olympic Sawmill [G.R. No. L-30771, May 28, 1984]

Facts

Plaintiff loaned P10,000.00, without interest, to defendant The loan became ultimately due on January 31, 1960, but was not paid on that date, with the debtors asking for an extension of three months, or up to April 30, 1960.

On March 17, 1960, the parties executed another loan document. Payment of the P10,000.00 was extended to April 30, 1960, but the obligation was increased by P6,000.00 as follows:
That the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00), Philippine currency shall form part of the principal obligation to answer for attorney’s fees, legal interest, and other cost incident thereto to be paid unto the creditor and his successors in interest upon the termination of this agreement.


Defendants again failed to pay their obligation by April 30, 1960 and, on September 23, 1960, plaintiff instituted this collection case. Defendants admitted the P10,000.00 principal obligation, but claimed that the additional P6,000.00 constituted usurious interest.


Issue

Whether or not, the P6000.00 constituted usurious interest.

Ruling

Moreover, for sometime now, usury has been legally non-existent. Interest can now be charged as lender and borrower may agree upon. The Rules of Court in regards to allegations of usury, procedural in nature, should be considered repealed with retroactive effect.

[CASE DIGEST] Leticia Y. Medel Dr. Rafael Medel and Servando Franco vs. Court of Appeals, Spouses Veronica R. Gonzales and Danilo G. Gonzales, Jr. [G.R. No. 131622. November 27, 1998]

Facts

Servando and Leticia obtained a loan from Veronica, who was engaged in the money lending business.

Servando and Leticia with the latter’s husband, Dr. Rafael Medel, consolidated all their previous unpaid loans totaling P440,000.00, and sought from Veronica another loan in the amount of P60,000.00, bringing their indebtedness to a total of P500,000.00. The executed a promissory note

On maturity of the loan, the borrowers failed to pay the indebtedness.

Defendants Leticia and Rafael Medel alleged that the loan was the transaction of Leticia Yaptinchay, who executed a mortgage in favor of the plaintiffs over a parcel of real estate situated in San Juan, Batangas; that the interest rate is excessive at 5.5% per month with additional service charge of 2% per annum, and penalty charge of 1% per month; that the stipulation for attorney’s fees of 25% ofthe amount due is unconscionable, illegal and excessive, and that substantial payments made were applied to interest, penalties and other charges.

Issue:     

Whether or not, the interest rate of 5.5% is usurious.

Ruling

No. The Court agree with petitioners that the stipulated rate of interest at 5.5% per month on the P500,000.00 loan is excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. However, we can not consider the rate “usurious” because this Court has consistently held that Circular No. 905 of the Central Bank, adopted on December 22, 1982, has expressly removed the interest ceilings prescribed by the Usury Law and that the Usury Law is now “legally inexistent”.

[CASE DIGEST] George l. Parks vs. Province of Tarlac, Municipality of Tarlac, Concepcion Cirer, and James Hill [G.R. No. L-24190, July 13, 1926]

Facts:

Concepcion Cirer and James Hill donated to Province of Tarlac a parcel of land subject to the condition that it was to be used for the erection of a central school and a public park, the work to commence within the period of six (6) months from the date of the ratifi cation by the parties of the deed of donation. The donation was accepted by Province of Tarlac and title to the property was transferred to it. Subsequently, Concepcion Cirer and James Hill sold the land to George L. Parks. George L. Parks claimed that since the condition imposed was not complied with, there was no donation.

Issue:

Whether or not it is condition subsequent?

Ruling:

It is a condition subsequent. The characteristic of a condition precedent is that the acquisition of right is not effected while said condition is not complied with or is not deemed complied with. Meanwhile, nothing is acquired and there is only an expectancy of right.

Consequently, when a condition is imposed, the compliance of which cannot be effected except when the right is deemed acquired, such condition cannot be deemed a condition precedent. In the present case, the condition could not be complied with except after giving effect to the donation. The donee could not do any work on the donated land if the donation had not really been effected because it would be an invasion of another’s title, for the land would have continued to belong to the donor so long as the condition imposed was not complied with. The non-compliance with the condition is, however, a suffi cient cause for revocation.