Category: Uncategorized

Facts:

Juan Perez et al is a usufructuary of a parcel of land. The usufructuaries entered into a contract leasing the fishpond to Luis Keh . Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that the lessee cannot sublease the fishpond nor assign his rights to anyone.

 Ming Cosim and Luis Crisostomo two persuaded private respondent to take over the operation of Papaya Fishpond as petitioner Lee and his partner, petitioner Luis Keh, were allegedly losing money in its operation. Private respondent having acceded to the proposal, he and petitioners Lee and Keh executed a written agreement denominated as pakiao buwis whereby private respondent would take possession of the Papaya Fishpond.

Issue:

Whether or not, Luis Keh is liable for breach of contract under Article 1168.

Ruling:

Article 1168 of the Civil Code provides that when an obligation consists in not doing and the obligor does what has been forbidden him, it shall also be undone at his expense. The lease contract prohibited petitioner Luis Keh, as lessee, from subleasing the fishpond. In entering into the agreement for pakiao-buwis with private respondent, not to mention the apparent artifice that was his written agreement with petitioner Lee on January 9, 1978, petitioner Keh did exactly what was prohibited of him under the contract to sublease the fishpond to a third party.

That the agreement for pakiao-buwis was actually a sublease is borne out by the fact that private respondent paid petitioners Luis Keh and Juan Perez, through petitioner Tansinsin the amount of annual rental agreed upon in the lease contract between the usufructuaries and petitioner Keh. Petitioner Keh led private respondent to unwittingly incur expenses to improve the operation of the fishpond. By operation of law, therefore, petitioner Keh shall be liable to private respondent for the value of the improvements he had made in the fishpond or for P486,562.65 with interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the rendition of the decision of the trial court on September 6, 1989.

Facts:

A written contract provided that the defendant was to sell to the plaintiff 600 piculs of sugar. The defendant sought to prove by parol evidence that it was the understanding of the parties that the sugar was to be produced from the defendant’s growing crop. There was nothing in the wiring which could be construed to limit the agreement to the defendant’s own crop of sugar.

Issue:

 Whether or not the defendant’s obligation was extinguished due to fortuitous event.

Ruling:

No. The above quoted portion of the trial court’s opinion appears to be based upon the proposition that the sugar which was to be delivered by the defendant was that which he expected to obtain from his own hacienda and, as the dry weather destroyed his growing cane, he could not comply with his part of the contract. As we have indicated, this view is erroneous, as, under the contract, the defendant was not limited to his growth crop in order to make the delivery. He agreed to deliver the sugar and nothing is said in the contract about where he was to get it.

Facts:

By a public instrument dated June 11, 1914, the plaintiff sold to the defendant Marciana Felix, four parcels of land. The defendant Felix paid, at the time of the execution of the deed, the sum of P3,000 on account of the purchase price, and bound herself to pay the remainder in installments.

In January, 1915, the vendor, A. A. Addison, filed suit in Court of First Instance of Manila to compel Marciana Felix to make payment of the first installment. The defendant, jointly with her husband, answered the complaint and alleged by way of special defense that the plaintiff had absolutely failed to deliver to the defendant the lands that were the subject matter of the sale, notwithstanding the demands made upon him for this purpose.

Issue:

Whether or not, Marciana Felix acquires real right from the mere payment of the first installment of the contract of sale.

Ruling:

The Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation to deliver the thing sold. The thing is considered to be delivered when it is placed “in the hands and possession of the vendee.” (Civ. Code, art. 1462.) It is true that the same article declares that the execution of a public instruments is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control.