[CASE DIGEST] THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK (now UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES) vs. SPS. FRANCIS S. GUECO and MA. LUZ E. GUECO [G.R. No. 14196, February 12, 2001]

FACTS:

The respondent Gueco Spouses obtained a loan from petitioner to purchase a car. The Spouses executed promissory notes.

The Spouses defaulted in payment of installments. Consequently, the Bank filed civil action. The negotiations with resulted in the further reduction of the outstanding.

On August 29, 1995, Dr. Gueco delivered a manager’s check in amount of P150,000.00 but the car was not released because of his refusal to sign the Joint Motion to Dismiss.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the bank committed fraud in issuing Joint Motion to Dismiss.

RULING:

Fraud has been defined as the deliberate intention to cause damage or prejudice. It is the voluntary execution of a wrongful act, or a willful omission, knowing and intending the effects which naturally and necessarily arise from such act or omission; the fraud referred to in Article 1170 of the Civil Code is the deliberate and intentional evasion of the normal fulfillment of obligation. We fail to see how the act of the petitioner bank in requiring the respondent to sign the joint motion to dismiss could constitute as fraud. True, petitioner may have been remiss in informing Dr. Gueco that the signing of a joint motion to dismiss is a standard operating procedure of petitioner bank. However, this cannot in anyway have prejudiced Dr. Gueco. The motion to dismiss was in fact also for the benefit of Dr. Gueco, as the case filed by petitioner against it before the lower court would be dismissed with prejudice. The whole point of the parties entering into the compromise agreement was in order that Dr. Gueco would pay his outstanding account and in return petitioner would return the car and drop the case for money and replevin before the Metropolitan Trial Court. The joint motion to dismiss was but a natural consequence of the compromise agreement and simply stated that Dr. Gueco had fully settled his obligation, hence, the dismissal of the case.

[CASE DIGEST] Leung Ben vs. P. J. O’Brien, James A. Ostrand and Geo. R. Harvey [G.R. No. L-13602, April 6, 1918]

Facts:

Upon December 12, 1917, an action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila by P. J. O’Brien to recover of Leung Ben the sum of P15,000 alleged to have been lost by the plaintiff to the defendant in a series of gambling, banking and percentage games conducted ruing the two or three months prior to the institution of the suit. In his verified complaint the plaintiff asked for an attachment, under section 424, and 412 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, against the property of the defendant, on the ground that the latter was about to depart from the Philippine islands with intent to defraud his creditors. This attachment was issued; and acting under the authority thereof, the sheriff attached the sum of P15,000 which had been deposited by the defendant with the International Banking Corporation.

Issue:

Whether O’Brien’s obligation to return the money arises from law as stipulated in Art. 1157 of New Civil Code

Ruling:

Yes. Upon general principles,. recognize both the civil and common law, money lost in gaming and voluntarily paid by the loser to the winner can not in the absence of statue, be recovered in a civil action. But Act No. 1757 of the Philippine Commission, which defines and penalizes several forms of gambling, contains numerous provisions recognizing the right to recover money lost in gambling or in the playing of certain games

[CASE DIGEST] Liam Law vs. Olympic Sawmill [G.R. No. L-30771, May 28, 1984]

Facts

Plaintiff loaned P10,000.00, without interest, to defendant The loan became ultimately due on January 31, 1960, but was not paid on that date, with the debtors asking for an extension of three months, or up to April 30, 1960.

On March 17, 1960, the parties executed another loan document. Payment of the P10,000.00 was extended to April 30, 1960, but the obligation was increased by P6,000.00 as follows:
That the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00), Philippine currency shall form part of the principal obligation to answer for attorney’s fees, legal interest, and other cost incident thereto to be paid unto the creditor and his successors in interest upon the termination of this agreement.


Defendants again failed to pay their obligation by April 30, 1960 and, on September 23, 1960, plaintiff instituted this collection case. Defendants admitted the P10,000.00 principal obligation, but claimed that the additional P6,000.00 constituted usurious interest.


Issue

Whether or not, the P6000.00 constituted usurious interest.

Ruling

Moreover, for sometime now, usury has been legally non-existent. Interest can now be charged as lender and borrower may agree upon. The Rules of Court in regards to allegations of usury, procedural in nature, should be considered repealed with retroactive effect.

[CASE DIGEST] Leticia Y. Medel Dr. Rafael Medel and Servando Franco vs. Court of Appeals, Spouses Veronica R. Gonzales and Danilo G. Gonzales, Jr. [G.R. No. 131622. November 27, 1998]

Facts

Servando and Leticia obtained a loan from Veronica, who was engaged in the money lending business.

Servando and Leticia with the latter’s husband, Dr. Rafael Medel, consolidated all their previous unpaid loans totaling P440,000.00, and sought from Veronica another loan in the amount of P60,000.00, bringing their indebtedness to a total of P500,000.00. The executed a promissory note

On maturity of the loan, the borrowers failed to pay the indebtedness.

Defendants Leticia and Rafael Medel alleged that the loan was the transaction of Leticia Yaptinchay, who executed a mortgage in favor of the plaintiffs over a parcel of real estate situated in San Juan, Batangas; that the interest rate is excessive at 5.5% per month with additional service charge of 2% per annum, and penalty charge of 1% per month; that the stipulation for attorney’s fees of 25% ofthe amount due is unconscionable, illegal and excessive, and that substantial payments made were applied to interest, penalties and other charges.

Issue:     

Whether or not, the interest rate of 5.5% is usurious.

Ruling

No. The Court agree with petitioners that the stipulated rate of interest at 5.5% per month on the P500,000.00 loan is excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. However, we can not consider the rate “usurious” because this Court has consistently held that Circular No. 905 of the Central Bank, adopted on December 22, 1982, has expressly removed the interest ceilings prescribed by the Usury Law and that the Usury Law is now “legally inexistent”.

[CASE DIGEST] George l. Parks vs. Province of Tarlac, Municipality of Tarlac, Concepcion Cirer, and James Hill [G.R. No. L-24190, July 13, 1926]

Facts:

Concepcion Cirer and James Hill donated to Province of Tarlac a parcel of land subject to the condition that it was to be used for the erection of a central school and a public park, the work to commence within the period of six (6) months from the date of the ratifi cation by the parties of the deed of donation. The donation was accepted by Province of Tarlac and title to the property was transferred to it. Subsequently, Concepcion Cirer and James Hill sold the land to George L. Parks. George L. Parks claimed that since the condition imposed was not complied with, there was no donation.

Issue:

Whether or not it is condition subsequent?

Ruling:

It is a condition subsequent. The characteristic of a condition precedent is that the acquisition of right is not effected while said condition is not complied with or is not deemed complied with. Meanwhile, nothing is acquired and there is only an expectancy of right.

Consequently, when a condition is imposed, the compliance of which cannot be effected except when the right is deemed acquired, such condition cannot be deemed a condition precedent. In the present case, the condition could not be complied with except after giving effect to the donation. The donee could not do any work on the donated land if the donation had not really been effected because it would be an invasion of another’s title, for the land would have continued to belong to the donor so long as the condition imposed was not complied with. The non-compliance with the condition is, however, a suffi cient cause for revocation.

[CASE DIGEST] Juan L. Perez, Luis Keh, Charlie Lee and Rosendo G. Tansinsin, JR. vs. Court of Appeals, Luis Crisostomo and Vicente Asuncion [G.R. No. 107737. October 1, 1999]

Facts:

Juan Perez et al is a usufructuary of a parcel of land. The usufructuaries entered into a contract leasing the fishpond to Luis Keh . Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that the lessee cannot sublease the fishpond nor assign his rights to anyone.

 Ming Cosim and Luis Crisostomo two persuaded private respondent to take over the operation of Papaya Fishpond as petitioner Lee and his partner, petitioner Luis Keh, were allegedly losing money in its operation. Private respondent having acceded to the proposal, he and petitioners Lee and Keh executed a written agreement denominated as pakiao buwis whereby private respondent would take possession of the Papaya Fishpond.

Issue:

Whether or not, Luis Keh is liable for breach of contract under Article 1168.

Ruling:

Article 1168 of the Civil Code provides that when an obligation consists in not doing and the obligor does what has been forbidden him, it shall also be undone at his expense. The lease contract prohibited petitioner Luis Keh, as lessee, from subleasing the fishpond. In entering into the agreement for pakiao-buwis with private respondent, not to mention the apparent artifice that was his written agreement with petitioner Lee on January 9, 1978, petitioner Keh did exactly what was prohibited of him under the contract to sublease the fishpond to a third party.

That the agreement for pakiao-buwis was actually a sublease is borne out by the fact that private respondent paid petitioners Luis Keh and Juan Perez, through petitioner Tansinsin the amount of annual rental agreed upon in the lease contract between the usufructuaries and petitioner Keh. Petitioner Keh led private respondent to unwittingly incur expenses to improve the operation of the fishpond. By operation of law, therefore, petitioner Keh shall be liable to private respondent for the value of the improvements he had made in the fishpond or for P486,562.65 with interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the rendition of the decision of the trial court on September 6, 1989.

[CASE DIGEST] YU TEK and CO vs. BASILIO GONZALES, G.R. No. L-9935, February 1, 1915

Facts:

A written contract provided that the defendant was to sell to the plaintiff 600 piculs of sugar. The defendant sought to prove by parol evidence that it was the understanding of the parties that the sugar was to be produced from the defendant’s growing crop. There was nothing in the wiring which could be construed to limit the agreement to the defendant’s own crop of sugar.

Issue:

 Whether or not the defendant’s obligation was extinguished due to fortuitous event.

Ruling:

No. The above quoted portion of the trial court’s opinion appears to be based upon the proposition that the sugar which was to be delivered by the defendant was that which he expected to obtain from his own hacienda and, as the dry weather destroyed his growing cane, he could not comply with his part of the contract. As we have indicated, this view is erroneous, as, under the contract, the defendant was not limited to his growth crop in order to make the delivery. He agreed to deliver the sugar and nothing is said in the contract about where he was to get it.

[CASE DIGEST] A. A. Addison vs. Marciana Felix and Balbino Tioco

Facts:

By a public instrument dated June 11, 1914, the plaintiff sold to the defendant Marciana Felix, four parcels of land. The defendant Felix paid, at the time of the execution of the deed, the sum of P3,000 on account of the purchase price, and bound herself to pay the remainder in installments.

In January, 1915, the vendor, A. A. Addison, filed suit in Court of First Instance of Manila to compel Marciana Felix to make payment of the first installment. The defendant, jointly with her husband, answered the complaint and alleged by way of special defense that the plaintiff had absolutely failed to deliver to the defendant the lands that were the subject matter of the sale, notwithstanding the demands made upon him for this purpose.

Issue:

Whether or not, Marciana Felix acquires real right from the mere payment of the first installment of the contract of sale.

Ruling:

The Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation to deliver the thing sold. The thing is considered to be delivered when it is placed “in the hands and possession of the vendee.” (Civ. Code, art. 1462.) It is true that the same article declares that the execution of a public instruments is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of possession. The thing sold must be placed in his control.

[CASE DIGEST] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HENRY T. GO G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014

FACTS

An information was filed against Henry Go for alleged violation of entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government and for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile.

Henry Go filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019

ISSUE

WON  the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private person who was alleged to have conspired with a public official whose salary grade is 27 and that public official has died prior to the filing of the information.

RULING

The SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent.

[CASE DIGEST] ARNEL ESCOBAL vs HON. GARCHITORENA G.R. No. 12644 February 5, 2004

FACTS

The Petitioner, Police Inspector  Arnel Escobal, with salary grade 23, was charged with murder when he got involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of Rodney Nueca.

The petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the RTC. The RTC ordered conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit Re-Amended Information, as well as the complete records with the stenographic notes, to the Sandiganbayan.

Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered to return the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the court of origin, RTC of Naga City, Branch 21. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975,18 the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that the petitioner had a salary grade of “23.”

ISSUE

WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a police officer whose salary grade is 23 and the offense happened in performance of his duties.

RULING

Yes.

Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below “27,” the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade “23.” He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.