[CASE DIGEST] JAKERSON G. GARGALLO vs. DOHLE SEAFRONT CREWING (MANILA), INC., DOHLE MANNING AGENCIES, INC., AND MR. MAYRONILO B. PADIZ [G.R. No. 215551, August 17, 2016]

The Facts


On July 20, 2012, petitioner filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits against respondents before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The complaint stemmed from his claim that: (a) he accidentally fell on deck while lifting heavy loads of lube oil drum, with his left arm hitting the floor first, bearing his full body weight; (b) he has remained permanently unfit for further sea service despite major surgery and further treatment by the company-designated physicians; and (c) his permanent total unfitness to work was duly certified by his chosen physician whose certification must prevail over the palpably self-serving and biased assessment of the company-designated physicians.


For their part, respondents countered that the fit-to-work findings of the company-designated physicians must prevail over that of petitioner’s independent doctor, considering that: (a) they were the ones who continuously treated and monitored petitioner’s medical condition; and (b) petitioner failed to comply with the conflict-resolution procedure under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). Respondents further averred that the filing of the disability claim was premature since petitioner was still undergoing medical treatment within the allowable 240-day period at the time the complaint was filed.


The Labor Arbiter (LA)11 and the NLRC12 gave more credence to the medical report of petitioner’s independent doctor and, thus, granted petitioner’s disability claim.


However, the CA disagreed with the conclusions of the LA and the NLRC, and dismissed petitioner’s complaint. It ruled that the claim was premature because at the time the complaint was filed.

Issue

Whether or not, the independent doctor of the petitioner shall be given credence to determine the disability of the petitioner.

Ruling


No. Moreover, petitioner failed to comply with the prescribed procedure under the afore-quoted Section 20 (A) (3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC on the joint appointment by the parties of a third doctor, in case the seafarer’s personal doctor disagrees with the company-designated physician’s fit-to-work assessment.

In the recent case of Veritas Maritime Corporation v. Gepanaga, Jr. involving an almost identical provision of the CBA, the Court reiterated the well-settled rule that the seafarer’s non-compliance with the mandated conflict-resolution procedure under the POEA-SEC and the CBA militates against his claims, and results in the affirmance of the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician, thus:

The [POEA-SEC] and the CBA clearly provide that when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated physician.

If the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the company-designated physician’s assessment, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer to be the decision final and binding on them.


Thus, while petitioner had the right to seek a second and even a third opinion, the final determination of whose decision must prevail must be done in accordance with an agreed procedure. Unfortunately, the petitioner did not avail of this procedure; hence, we have no option but to declare that the company-designated doctor’s certification is the final determination that must prevail.

[CASE DIGEST] JOCELYN S. LIMKAICHONG vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, THROUGH THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER [G.R. No. 158464, August 02, 2016]

Facts:
The petitioner was the registered owner of agricultural lands with a total area of 19.68 hectares situated in Villegas, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental.

After the petitioner rejected such valuation of her lands, the DARAB conducted summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation.8 On May 28, 1999, the DARAB issued its order affirming the valuation of the lands upon finding the valuation consistent with existing administrative guidelines on land valuation.


On August 19, 1999, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Dumaguete City a complaint for the fixing of just compensation for her lands. Her complaint prayed that the DARAB valuation be set aside and declared null and void, and that in its stead the price of her lands be fixed based on the fair market value thereof.


After filing their answer, the respondents filed a manifestation and motion to dismiss,11 stating that the petitioner’s failure to timely appeal the May 28, 1999 DARAB order had rendered the order final and executor.

Issue:

Whether, the RTC, sitting as SAC, has jurisdiction over cases for just compensation that were filed beyond reglementary period.

Ruling:

To resolve the conflict in the rulings of the Court, we now declare herein, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, that the better rule is that stated in Philippine Veterans Bank, reiterated in Lubrica and in the August 14, 2007 Decision in this case. Thus, while a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision but an original action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicator’s decision will attain finality. This rule is not only in accord with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity. Verily, a belated petition before the SAC, e.g., one filed a month, or a year, or even a decade after the land valuation of the DAR adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as to the true value of his property.


However, we cannot fairly and properly hold that the petitioner’s complaint for the determination of just compensation should be barred from being tried and decided on that basis. The prevailing rule at the time she filed her complaint on August 19, 1999 was that enunciated in Republic v. Court of Appeals on October 30, 1996.47 The pronouncement in Philippine Veterans Bank was promulgated on January 18, 2000 when the trial was already in progress in the RTC, At any rate, it would only be eight years afterwards that the Court en banc unanimously resolved the jurisprudential conundrum through its declaration in Land Bank v. Martinez that the better rule was that enunciated in Philippine Veterans Bank, The Court must, therefore, prospectively apply Philippine Veterans Bank. The effect is that the petitioner’s cause of action for the proper valuation of her expropriated property should be allowed to proceed. Hence, her complaint to recover just compensation was properly brought in the RTC as the SAC, whose dismissal of it upon the motion of Land Bank should be undone.

[CASE DIGEST] LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NARCISO L. KHO [G.R. No. 205839, July 07, 2016]

Facts:

The respondent Narciso Kho is the sole proprietor of United Oil Petroleum, a business engaged in trading diesel fuel. Sometime in December 2006, he entered into a verbal agreement to purchase lubricants from Red Orange International Trading (Red Orange), represented by one Rudy Medel. Red Orange insisted that it would only accept a Land Bank manager’s check as payment.

On December 28, 2005, Kho opened an account with Land Bank in order to leverage a business deal with Red Orange;

He purchased Land Bank Manager’s check No. 07410 worth ₱25,000,000.00 payable to Red Orange and dated January 2, 2006;

He also gave Rudy Medel a photocopy of the check that the bank had given him;

After his visit to the Bank, the deal with Medel and Red Orange did not push through;

He picked up check No. 07410 from the bank on January 2, 2006, without informing the bank that the deal did not materialize;

Afterwards, Red Orange presented a spurious copy of check No. 07410 to BPI, Kamuning for payment;

Land Bank cleared the check;

However, Kho never negotiated the actual check. It was in his possession the whole time.

Hence, on January 23, 2006, Kho filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against Land Bank.

Kho asserted that the manager’s check No. 07410 was still in his possession and that he had no obligation to inform Land Bank whether or not he had already negotiated the check.

On the other hand, Land Bank argued that Kho was negligent because he handed Medel a photocopy of the manager’s check and that this was the proximate cause of his loss.

On April 30, 2009, the RTC dismissed the complaint.

Citing Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals, the RTC reasoned that the failure of the purchaser/drawer to exercise ordinary care that substantially contributed to the making of the forged check precludes him from asserting the forgery.

Kho appealed to the CA.

On August 30, 2012, the CA set aside the RTC’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Dissatisfied, Land Bank, Flores, and Cruz, filed separately petitions for review on certiorari before this Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Kho’s handing of the photocopy of the Manager’s check to Medel was the proximate cause of the fraudulent act.

Ruling:

That said, we cannot agree that the proximate causes of the loss were Kho’s act of giving Medel a photocopy of check No. 07410 and his failure to inform Land Bank that his deal with Red Orange did not push through.

The genuine check No. 07410 remained in Kho’s possession the entire time and Land Bank admits that the check it cleared was a fake. When Land Bank’s CCD forwarded the deposited check to its Araneta branch for inspection, its officers had every opportunity to recognize the forgery of their signatures or the falsity of the check. Whether by error or neglect, the bank failed to do so, which led to the withdrawal and eventual loss of the ₱25,000,000.00.

This is the proximate cause of the loss. Land Bank breached its duty of diligence and assumed the risk of incurring a loss on account of a forged or counterfeit check. Hence, it should suffer the resulting damage.

[CASE DIGEST] LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 221636]

The Facts

The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) subjected the 71.4715 hectare land of private respondents to the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued the property in the amount of Pl,620,750.72. Private respondents rejected the valuation but petitioner still deposited the amount in their favor.

On October 29, 1998, private respondents filed before Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), a case for determination of just compensation. The SAC ordered petitioner to re-value the property, which it did, coming up with a new valuation of Pl,803,904.76. The SAC upheld the new valuation in its May 14, 2013 Decision.

Private respondents filed a notice of appeal under Rule 41 before the SAC, which gave the notice due course. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that private respondents availed a wrong mode of appeal. On May 21, 2015, the CA denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss on grounds of liberality in the construction of the Rules of Court. To wit:

Rules of procedure are tools designed not to thwart but to facilitate the attainment of justice; thus, their strict and rigid application may, for good and deserving reasons, have to give way to, and be subordinated by, the need to aptly dispense substantial justice in the normal course. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice. Circumspect leniency will give the plaintiff-appellant “the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint rather than to lose property on technicalities.”

Issue

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it arbitrarily disregarded the long-standing jurisprudence that appeals from the decision of the SAC must be via a petition for review under Rule 42 and not by ordinary appeal.

Ruling

Yes. While it is true that we have applied a liberal application of the rules of procedure in a number of cases, we have stressed that this can be invoked only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. We agree with petitioner’s contention that the CA and private respondents did not proffer a reasonable cause to justify non-compliance with the rules besides the exhortation of circumspect leniency in order to give private respondents a day in court. Private respondents failed to specifically cite any justification as to how and why a normal application of procedural rules would frustrate their quest for justice. Indeed, private respondents have not been forthright in explaining why they chose the wrong mode of appeal. The bare invocation of “the interest of substantial justice” line is not some magic wand that will automatically compel us to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled, let alone dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantial rights. Utter disregard of the rules cannot be justly rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction.

[CASE DIGEST] AIR FRANCE vs. CARRASCOSO and COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966]

Facts


          On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a “first class” round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in “first class”, but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the “first class” seat that he was occupying because there was a “white man”, who, the Manager alleged, had a “better right” to the seat. When asked to vacate his “first class” seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant’s Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man” and plaintiff reluctantly gave his “first class” seat in the plane.

Issue

Whether there is a breach of contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso that would hold Air France liable for damages.

Ruling

Yes. Petitioner’s contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

[CASE DIGEST] ALITALIA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT [G.R. No. 71929, December 4, 1990.]

Facts

Dr. Felipa Pablo, a professor, was invited to take part at a meeting in Ispra, Italy. To fulfill this engagement, Dr. Pablo booked passage on petitioner airline, ALITALIA.

She arrived in Milan on the day before the meeting in accordance with the itinerary and time table set for her by ALITALIA. She was however told by the ALITALIA personnel there at Milan that her luggage was “delayed inasmuch as the same (was) in one of the succeeding flights from Rome to Milan.” But the other flights arriving from Rome did not have her baggage on board. She returned to Manila without attending the meeting in Ispra, Italy.

Issue

Whether or not the Warsaw Convention can restrict compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo.

Ruling

The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airline’s liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. Such a proposition is not borne out by the language of the Convention, as this Court has now, and at an earlier time, pointed out

Certainly, the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo cannot under the circumstances be restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the transport of baggage.

[CASE DIGEST] JOSE CANGCO vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO. [G.R. No. L-12191, October 14, 1918]

Facts

Jose Cangco, was in the employment the respondent.  One day, the plaintiff arose from his seat and stepped off the train, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.

Issue

Whether or not Cangco committed Contributory negligence.

Ruling

In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act — that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly — the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

[CASE DIGEST] FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. ESTRELLA O. QUERIMIT [G.R. No. 148582. January 16, 2002]

Facts

Querimit opened a dollar savings account in petitioners’ branch for which she was issued four (4) Certificates of Deposit. The certificates bore the word accrued, which meant that if they were not presented for encashment or pre-terminated prior to maturity.
In January 1993, her husband died. She went to petitioner FEBTC to withdraw her deposit but, to her dismay, she was told that her husband had withdrawn the money in deposit.

Issue

Whether or not FEBTC performed the degree of diligence required for banks.

Ruling

Petitioner FEBTC thus failed to exercise that degree of diligence required by the nature of its business. Because the business of banks is impressed with public interest, the degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of the family or of an ordinary business firm. The fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors requires them to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. A bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care whether such accounts consist only of a few hundred pesos or of millions of pesos. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable. Petitioner failed to prove payment of the subject certificates of deposit issued to the respondent and, therefore, remains liable for the value of the dollar deposits indicated thereon with accrued interest.

[CASE DIGEST]NARCISO GUTIERREZ,vs.BONIFACIO GUTIERREZ, MARIA V. DE GUTIERREZ, MANUEL GUTIERREZ, ABELARDO VELASCO, and SATURNINO CORTEZ[G.R. No. 34840, September 23, 1931]

Facts

On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road. The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and was owned by Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and was owned by Bonifacio’s father and mother, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the mother, together will several other members of the Gutierrez family were accommodated therein. A passenger in the autobus, by the name of Narciso Gutierrez, was en route from San Pablo, Laguna, to Manila. The collision between the bus and the automobile resulted in Narciso Gutierrez suffering a fracture right leg which required medical attendance for a considerable period of time.

Issue

Whether or not, Manuel Gutierrez may be held liable for damages as head of house for acts of his minor child Bonifacio Gutierrez.

Ruling

The head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children, whom he designates or permits to run it, where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner’s family than the child driving it.

[CASE DIGEST] Levy Hermanos, vs. Pedro A. Paterno [G.R. No. L-5515, February 1, 1911]

Facts
The defendant executed in favor of the plaintiffs the following document:

Vale for the sum of P6,177.35 in favor of Messrs. Levy Brothers, as the balance of my account with them to date, payable in partial payments.
The defendant made several partial payments and later claimed the right to establish, as a fixed rate for future payments, the installment of P30 a month. The plaintiffs, disagreeing with such a claim, brought suit against the defendant and asked that the latter be sentenced to pay them the sum of P5,862.35, the unpaid balance, or that a period be specified within which he should pay the same, in case the court should deem such manner of payment more equitable.

Issue

Whether or not the court may fix the duration of period of an obligation.

Ruling
It is evident that the term for payment was granted for the exclusive benefit of the defendant and for his own convenience, as by the language of the document, the plaintiffs gained nothing by the fact that the debt was not immediately demandable. Nor was any interest stipulated on the debt during the time that it should remain unpaid by the defendant. For the foregoing reasons, and in whatever manner this case be considered, it is unquestionable that it falls within the provisions of article 1128 of the Civil Code.