[CASE DIGEST] GARCIA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 170122 Octover 12, 2009

FACTS

To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of PhP 143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had allegedly amassed and acquired, the Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 1379,3 filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on October 29, 2004 a petition for the forfeiture of those properties.

ISSUE

Whether or not, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over separate forfeiture cases.

RULING

Yes. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.

As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20, 2005 Resolution,13 the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense, thus:

Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties. The action of forfeiture arises when a “public officer or employee [acquires] during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion of his salary x x x and to his other lawful income x x x.” Such amount of property is then presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. Thus “if the respondent [public official] is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State.

[CASE DIGEST] SERANA vs SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 162059 Jan. 22, 2008

FACTS

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada a student regent of UP.

Serana discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.

President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President.

 The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan

ISSUE

Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of Estafa.

RULING

Yes. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

[CASE DIGEST] Spouse Velarde, vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 108346, July 11, 2001]

FACTS:

David Raymund executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage in favor if Avelina Velarde for a parcel of land under TCT 142177. The land together with the house and improvements thereon were mortgaged by David Raymundo to BPI to secure a loan of 1.8M.  As part of the consideration of the sale, the Avelina Velarde assumes to pay the mortgage obligations on the property.  The Application for Assumption of Mortgage with BPI was not approved. This prompted plaintiffs not to make any further payment.

David and George Raymundo, thru counsel, wrote Sps. Velarde informing the latter that their non-payment to the mortgage bank constitute[d] non-performance of their obligation

Sps. Velarde, thru counsel, responded, as follows:

“This is to advise you, therefore, that our client is willing to pay the balance in cash not later than January 21, 1987 provided:

(a) you deliver actual possession of the property to her not later than January 15, 1987 for her immediate occupancy;

(b) you cause the re- lease of title and mortgage from the Bank of P.I. and make the title available and free from any liens and encumbrances; and

(c) you execute an absolute deed of sale in her favor free from any liens or encumbrances not later than January”

David and George Raymundo sent Sps. Velarde a notarial notice of cancellation/rescission of the intended sale of the subject property allegedly due to the latter’s failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage and the Undertaking.

Issues:

  1. Whether there was a breach of contract.
  2. Whether the defendant has the right to rescind the contract.

Ruling:

First Issue:

Yes. In a contract of sale, the seller obligates itself to transfer the ownership of and deliver a determinate things, and the buyer to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.

Private respondents had already performed their obligation through the execution of the Deed of Sale, which effectively transferred ownership of the property to petitioner through constructive delivery. Prior physical delivery or possession is not legally required, and the execution of the Deed of Sale is deemed equivalent to delivery.

Petitioners, on the other hand, did not perform their correlative obligation of paying the contract price in the manner agreed upon. Worse, they wanted private respondents to perform obligations beyond those stipulated in the contract before fulfilling their own obligation to pay the full purchase price.

Second Issue:

Yes. Private respondents validly exercised their right to rescind the contract, because of the failure of petitioners to comply with their obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price. Indubitably, the latter violated the very essence of reciprocity in the contract of sale, a violation that consequently gave rise to private respondent’s right to rescind the same in accordance with law.

True, petitioners expressed their willingness to pay the balance of the purchase price one month after it became due; however, this was not equivalent to actual payment as would constitute a faithful compliance of their reciprocal obligation. Moreover, the offer to pay was conditioned on the performance by private respondents of additional burdens that had not been agreed upon in the original contract. Thus, it cannot be said that the breach committed by petitioners was merely slight or casual as would preclude the exercise of the right to rescind.