Lawyereering

Facts:

The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.

When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. From the evidence adduced in the case we believe that when the accident occurred the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing of the bridge was probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

Issue:

Whether or not, Frank Smith is liable for damages.

Ruling:

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.

Facts:

Respondents, spouses Eva Marie Ronquillo (Eva Marie) and Noel Benedicto (Noel) Ronquillo (the Ronquillo spouses or the spouses), had not been blessed with a child despite several years of marriage. They thus consulted petitioner, Dr. Concepcion Ilao-Oreta (Dr. Ilao-Oreta), an obstetrician-gynecologist-consultant at the St. Luke’s Medical Center where she was, at the time material to the case, the chief of the Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility Section.

Upon Dr. Ilao-Oreta’s advice, Eva Marie agreed to undergo a laparoscopic procedure whereby a laparascope would be inserted through the patient’s abdominal wall to get a direct view of her internal reproductive organ in order to determine the real cause of her infertility.

Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive at the scheduled time for the procedure, however, and no prior notice of its cancellation was received. It turned out that the doctor was on a return flight from Hawaii to, and arrived at 10:00 p.m. of April 5, 1999 in, Manila.

On May 18, 1999, the Ronquillo spouses filed a complaint 1 against Dr. Ilao-Oreta and the St. Luke’s Medical Center for breach of professional and service contract and for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City. They prayed for the award of actual damages including alleged loss of income of Noel while accompanying his wife to the hospital, moral damages, exemplary damages, the costs

In her Answer, 3 Dr. Ilao-Oreta gave her side of the case as follows: She went on a honeymoon to Hawaii and was scheduled to leave Hawaii at 3:00 p.m. of April 4, 1999 for Manila. Aware that her trip from Hawaii to Manila would take about 12 hours, inclusive of a stop-over at the Narita Airport in Japan, she estimated that she would arrive in Manila in the early morning of April 5, 1999. She thus believed in utmost good faith that she would be back in Manila in time for the scheduled conduct of the laparoscopic procedure. She failed to consider the time difference between Hawaii and the Philippines, however.

Issue:

Whether or not, Dr. Ilao-Oreta grossly neglected her duty.

Ruling:

The doctor’s negligence not being gross, the spouses are not entitled to recover moral damages.

“Gross negligence” implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. It is characterized by want or even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected.

Although petitioner failed to take into consideration the time difference between the Philippines and Hawaii, the situation then did not present any clear and apparent harm or injury that even a careless person may perceive. Unlike in situations where the Supreme Court had found gross negligence to exist, petitioner could not have been conscious of any foreseeable danger that may occur since she actually believed that she would make it to the operation that was elective in nature, the only purpose of which was to determine the real cause of infertility and not to treat and cure a life threatening disease. Thus, in merely fixing the date of her appointment with respondent Eva Marie Ronquillo, petitioner was not in the pursuit or performance of conduct which any ordinary person may deem to probably and naturally result in injury, thus persuades.

Facts:

On May 27, 1949, at or about 11:30 o’clock in the morning while the said Filomeno Managuit was in the course of his employment, performing his duties as such ordinary seaman on defendant’s M/S “Pilar II”, which was anchored then about 1 1/2 miles from the seashore of Arceli Dumarang, Palawan, his two-peso bill was blown by the breeze into the sea and in his effort to retrieve the same from the waters he was drowned.

Plaintiff’s claim is admittedly predicated upon Act No. 3428, otherwise known as the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Sec. 2. Grounds for compensation. — When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment, or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.

Sec. 4. Injuries not covered. — Compensation shall not be allowed for injuries caused (1) by the voluntary intent of the employee to inflict such injury upon himself or another person; (2) by drunkenness on the part of the laborer who had the accident; (3) by notorious negligence of the same.

Pursuant to these provisions — in so far as pertinent to the case at bar — three conditions are essential to hold an employer liable to compensate his employee for a personal injury sustained by him from an accident, namely: (1) the accident must arise out of the employment; (2) it must happen in the course of the employment; and (3) it must not be caused by the “notorious negligence” of the employee.

Issue:

Whether or not, Filomeno Managuit acted with notorious negligence and will bar his estate’s claim for damages.

Ruling:

Irrespective of whether or not the accident in question arose out of, or took place in the course of the employment, was it caused by his “notorious negligence”? The phrase “notorious negligence” has been held to be tantamount to “gross negligence”, which, in turn, has been defined as follows:

Gross negligence is define to be the want of even slight care and diligence.

It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea, one mile and a half from the seashore of Arceli, Dumarang, Palawan, Filomeno failed to exercise “even slight care and diligence,” that he displayed a “reckless disregard of the safety” of his person, that he could not have been but conscious of the probable consequences” of his carelessness and that he was “indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury.

Facts:

Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which are “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” cigarettes.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands ‘Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect subjected “Hope,” “More,” and “Champion” cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack.”

On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993. The same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof. On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93. In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.  It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.

On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint¹¹ for damages against petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss¹² contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum shopping was signed by respondent’s counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same.

On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to present evidence. It further held that the defect in the certification against forum shopping was cured by respondent’s submission of the corporate secretary’s certificate authorizing its counsel to execute the certification against forum shopping. The dispositive portion thereof, states:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Liwayway Vinzons-Chato and the motion to strike out and expunge from the record the said motion to dismiss filed by plaintiff Fortune Tobacco Corporation are both denied on the grounds aforecited. The defendant is ordered to file her answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.

SO ORDERED.¹³

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. It also sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the corporate secretary’s certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the same.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit is grounded on her acts done in the performance of her functions as a public officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which should be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. She further averred that the Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of public officers; while Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is a special law on the superior public officers’ liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the same is dismissible for failure to state a cause of action. As to the defect of the certification against forum shopping, she urged the Court to strictly construe the rules and to dismiss the complaint.

Issue:

Whether or not Art. 32 of the Civil Code is applicable to the case

Ruling:

Yes

Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an “act” that may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code. While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek damages for violation of constitutional rights.

Facts:

Respondents, spouses Eva Marie Ronquillo (Eva Marie) and Noel Benedicto (Noel) Ronquillo (the Ronquillo spouses or the spouses), had not been blessed with a child despite several years of marriage. They thus consulted petitioner, Dr. Concepcion Ilao-Oreta (Dr. Ilao-Oreta), an obstetrician-gynecologist-consultant at the St. Luke’s Medical Center where she was, at the time material to the case, the chief of the Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility Section.

Upon Dr. Ilao-Oreta’s advice, Eva Marie agreed to undergo a laparoscopic procedure whereby a laparascope would be inserted through the patient’s abdominal wall to get a direct view of her internal reproductive organ in order to determine the real cause of her infertility.

Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive at the scheduled time for the procedure, however, and no prior notice of its cancellation was received. It turned out that the doctor was on a return flight from Hawaii to, and arrived at 10:00 p.m. of April 5, 1999 in, Manila.

On May 18, 1999, the Ronquillo spouses filed a complaint 1 against Dr. Ilao-Oreta and the St. Luke’s Medical Center for breach of professional and service contract and for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City. They prayed for the award of actual damages including alleged loss of income of Noel while accompanying his wife to the hospital, moral damages, exemplary damages, the costs

In her Answer, 3 Dr. Ilao-Oreta gave her side of the case as follows: She went on a honeymoon to Hawaii and was scheduled to leave Hawaii at 3:00 p.m. of April 4, 1999 for Manila. Aware that her trip from Hawaii to Manila would take about 12 hours, inclusive of a stop-over at the Narita Airport in Japan, she estimated that she would arrive in Manila in the early morning of April 5, 1999. She thus believed in utmost good faith that she would be back in Manila in time for the scheduled conduct of the laparoscopic procedure. She failed to consider the time difference between Hawaii and the Philippines, however.

Issue:

Whether or not, Dr. Ilao-Oreta grossly neglected her duty.

Ruling:

The doctor’s negligence not being gross, the spouses are not entitled to recover moral damages.

“Gross negligence” implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. It is characterized by want or even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected.

Although petitioner failed to take into consideration the time difference between the Philippines and Hawaii, the situation then did not present any clear and apparent harm or injury that even a careless person may perceive. Unlike in situations where the Supreme Court had found gross negligence to exist, petitioner could not have been conscious of any foreseeable danger that may occur since she actually believed that she would make it to the operation that was elective in nature, the only purpose of which was to determine the real cause of infertility and not to treat and cure a life threatening disease. Thus, in merely fixing the date of her appointment with respondent Eva Marie Ronquillo, petitioner was not in the pursuit or performance of conduct which any ordinary person may deem to probably and naturally result in injury, thus persuades.

Facts:

On May 27, 1949, at or about 11:30 o’clock in the morning while the said Filomeno Managuit was in the course of his employment, performing his duties as such ordinary seaman on defendant’s M/S “Pilar II”, which was anchored then about 1 1/2 miles from the seashore of Arceli Dumarang, Palawan, his two-peso bill was blown by the breeze into the sea and in his effort to retrieve the same from the waters he was drowned.

Plaintiff’s claim is admittedly predicated upon Act No. 3428, otherwise known as the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Sec. 2. Grounds for compensation. — When any employee receives a personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by such employment, or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.

Sec. 4. Injuries not covered. — Compensation shall not be allowed for injuries caused (1) by the voluntary intent of the employee to inflict such injury upon himself or another person; (2) by drunkenness on the part of the laborer who had the accident; (3) by notorious negligence of the same.

Pursuant to these provisions — in so far as pertinent to the case at bar — three conditions are essential to hold an employer liable to compensate his employee for a personal injury sustained by him from an accident, namely: (1) the accident must arise out of the employment; (2) it must happen in the course of the employment; and (3) it must not be caused by the “notorious negligence” of the employee.

Issue:

Whether or not, Filomeno Managuit acted with notorious negligence and will bar his estate’s claim for damages.

Ruling:

Irrespective of whether or not the accident in question arose out of, or took place in the course of the employment, was it caused by his “notorious negligence”? The phrase “notorious negligence” has been held to be tantamount to “gross negligence”, which, in turn, has been defined as follows:

Gross negligence is define to be the want of even slight care and diligence.

It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea, one mile and a half from the seashore of Arceli, Dumarang, Palawan, Filomeno failed to exercise “even slight care and diligence,” that he displayed a “reckless disregard of the safety” of his person, that he could not have been but conscious of the probable consequences” of his carelessness and that he was “indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury.

Facts:

Petitioner CFTI held a concessionaire’s contract with the Army Air Force Exchange Services (“AAFES”) for the operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio F. Naguiat was CFTI’s president, while Antolin T. Naguiat was its vice-president. Like Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated (“Naguiat Enterprises”), a trading firm, it was a family-owned corporation.

Due to the phase-out of the US military bases in the Philippines, from which Clark Air Base was not spared, the AAFES was dissolved, and the services of individual respondents were officially terminated on November 26, 1991.

The AAFES Taxi Drivers Association (“drivers’ union”), through its local president, Eduardo Castillo, and CFTI held negotiations as regards separation benefits that should be awarded in favor of the drivers. They arrived at an agreement that the separated drivers will be given P500.00 for every year of service as severance pay. Most of the drivers accepted said amount in December 1991 and January 1992. However, individual respondents herein refused to accept theirs.

Instead, after disaffiliating themselves from the drivers’ union, individual respondents, through the National Organization of Workingmen (“NOWM”), a labor organization which they subsequently joined, filed a complaint 5 against “Sergio F. Naguiat doing business under the name and style Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., Army-Air Force Exchange Services (AAFES) with Mark Hooper as Area Service Manager, Pacific Region, and AAFES Taxi Drivers Association with Eduardo Castillo as President,” for payment of separation pay due to termination/phase-out. Said complaint was later amended 6 to include additional taxi drivers who were similarly situated as complainants, and CFTI with Antolin T. Naguiat as vice president and general manager, as party respondent.

Private respondents failed to substantiate their claim that Naguiat Enterprises managed, supervised and controlled their employment. It appears that they were confused on the personalities of Sergio F. Naguiat as an individual who was the president of CFTI, and Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., as a separate corporate entity with a separate business. They presumed that Sergio F. Naguiat, who was at the same time a stockholder and director 27 of Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., was managing and controlling the taxi business on behalf of the latter. A closer scrutiny and analysis of the records, however, evince the truth of the matter: that Sergio F. Naguiat, in supervising the-taxi drivers and determining their employment terms, was rather carrying out his responsibilities as president of CFTI. Hence, Naguiat Enterprises as a separate corporation does not appear to be involved at all in the taxi business.

Issue:

Whether or Not a company president should be held solidarily liable by not paying proper separation pays to his/her employees.

Ruling:

Petitioner-corporations would likewise want to avoid the solidary liability of their officers. To bolster their position, Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T. Naguiat specifically aver that they were denied due process since they were not parties to the complaint below. ³² In the broader interest of justice, we, however, hold that Sergio F. Naguiat, in his capacity as president of CFTI, cannot be exonerated from joint and several liability in the payment of separation pay to individual respondents.

A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. NLRC is the case in point. A.C. Ransom Corporation was a family corporation, the stockholders of which were members of the Hernandez family. In 1973, it filed an application for clearance to close or cease operations, which was duly granted by the Ministry of Labor and Employment, without prejudice to the right of employees to seek redress of grievance, if any. Backwages of 22 employees, who engaged in a strike prior to the closure, were subsequently computed at P164,984.00. Up to September 1976, the union filed about ten (10) motions for execution against the corporation, but none could be implemented, presumably for failure to find leviable assets of said corporation. In its last motion for execution, the union asked that officers and agents of the company be held personally liable for payment of the backwages. This was granted by the labor arbiter. In the corporation’s appeal to the NLRC, one of the issues raised was: “Is the judgment against a corporation to reinstate its dismissed employees with backwages, enforceable against its officer and agents, in their individual, private and personal capacities, who were not parties in the case where the judgment was rendered!” The NLRC answered in the negative, on the ground that officers of a corporation are not liable personally for official acts unless they exceeded the scope of their authority.

On certiorari, this Court reversed the NLRC and upheld the labor arbiter. In imposing joint and several liability upon the company president, the Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, ratiocinated this wise:

(b) How can the foregoing (Articles 265 and 273 of the Labor Code) provisions be implemented when the employer is a corporation? The answer is found in Article 212(c) of the Labor Code which provides:

(c) “Employer” includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or any of its officers or agents except when acting as employer.

The foregoing was culled from Section 2 of RA 602, the Minimum Wage Law. Since RANSOM is an artificial person, it must have an officer who can be presumed to be the employer, being the “person acting in the interest of (the) employer” RANSOM. The corporation, only in the technical sense, is the employer.

The responsible officer of an employer corporation can be held personally, not to say even criminally, liable for nonpayment of back wages. That is the policy of the law. . . .

(c) If the policy of the law were otherwise, the corporation employer can have devious ways for evading payment of back wages. . . .

(d) The record does not clearly identify “the officer or officers” of RANSOM directly responsible for failure to pay the back wages of the 22 strikers. In the absence of definite Proof in that regard, we believe it should be presumed that the responsible officer is the President of the corporation who can be deemed the chief operation officer thereof. Thus, in RA 602, criminal responsibility is with the “Manager or in his default, the person acting as such.” In RANSOM. the President appears to be the Manager. (Emphasis supplied.)

Sergio F. Naguiat, admittedly, was the president of CFTI who actively managed the business. Thus, applying the ruling in A.C. Ransom, he falls within the meaning of an “employer” as contemplated by the Labor Code, who may be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees.

Moreover, petitioners also conceded that both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were “close family corporations” owned by the Naguiat family. Section 100, paragraph 5, (under Title XII on Close Corporations) of the Corporation Code, states:

(5) To the extent that the stockholders are actively engage(d) in the management or operation of the business and affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders shall be held to strict fiduciary duties to each other and among themselves. Said stockholders shall be personally liable for corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance. (emphasis supplied)

Nothing in the records show whether CFTI obtained “reasonably adequate liability insurance;” thus, what remains is to determine whether there was corporate tort.

Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of “corporate tort.” Essentially, “tort” consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law.  Simply stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty.  Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates the employer to grant separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, which is the condition obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to comply with this law-imposed duty or obligation. Consequently, its stockholder who was actively engaged in the management or operation of the business should be held personally liable.